MALICIOUS DAMAGE
Description
5
A deliberate act of damaging, destroying, or obstructing the functioning of a system, organisation, or operation, typically with the intent to cause harm, disrupt activities, or undermine success.
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Rating actions
8.11.2024
AFFIRMED
HEIGHTENED LIKELIHOOD OF INCREASE IN THE COMING WEEKS
AKE has affirmed the malicious damage risk rating in Europe. Moscow continued to wage hybrid warfare against ​​Europe and AKE has recorded 1 case of alleged sabotage attempts in the past week (please see details below). However, there have been no significant incidents that would indicate that Russia intensified the campaign.
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AKE notes that this risk is likely to increase should Western powers allow Ukraine to use Western-provided long range weapons against targets within Russia.
Sabotage incidents
1 November - 8 November 2024
Rating actions history
TERRORISM
Description
2
Terrorism is the use of violence, intimidation, or threats to create fear and achieve political, ideological, or religious objectives. It typically involves deliberately targeting civilians, governments, or institutions to exert pressure, disrupt societies, or provoke widespread panic. Unlike conventional warfare, terrorism aims not only at physical damage but also at psychological impact, seeking to influence public opinion or force changes in policy through shock and fear. The motives and methods can vary widely, but the core goal is to advance a particular agenda by leveraging fear as a weapon.
Rating actions
8.11.2024
AFFIRMED
LOW LIKELIHOOD OF INCREASE IN THE COMING WEEKS
AKE has affirmed the terrorism risk rating.
Rating actions history
RIOTS, STRIKES AND CIVIL COMMOTATION
Description
2
Riots, Strikes and Civil Commotion refer to collective public disturbances involving disorderly or disruptive actions. Riots are spontaneous, violent outbreaks often leading to property damage. Strikes are organised work stoppages to protest or demand changes, while civil commotion encompasses widespread unrest or protests that can escalate into violence, disrupting social and economic stability.
Rating actions
8.11.2024
AFFIRMED
LOW LIKELIHOOD OF INCREASE IN THE COMING WEEKS
AKE has affirmed the riots, strikes and civil commotion risk rating in Europe.
Rating actions history
COLLATERAL DAMAGE
Description
2
Collateral damage refers to unintentional harm, injury, or damage inflicted on people, property, or the environment that occurs as a side effect of a military operation or other large-scale action. It is typically not the intended target but rather an unintended consequence of efforts to achieve a specific objective.​​
Rating actions
8.11.2024
AFFIRMED
LOW LIKELIHOOD OF INCREASE IN THE COMING WEEKS
AKE has affirmed the collateral damage risk rating in Europe.
Rating actions history
DIRECT TARGETING
Description
2
Direct targeting refers to the intentional selection and attack of specific individuals, locations, or assets with the aim of achieving a strategic objective. Unlike incidental damage, direct targeting is deliberate and focused, often intended to eliminate key threats, disrupt critical infrastructure, or achieve precise tactical outcomes.​​
Rating actions
8.11.2024
AFFIRMED
LOW LIKELIHOOD OF INCREASE IN THE COMING WEEKS
AKE has affirmed the direct targeting risk rating in Europe.
Rating actions history
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
WESTERN APPROVAL OF LONG-RANGE WEAPONS' USE
Recent developments
The primary focus of the recent debate within NATO has been whether Washington and Westminster would approve of the use of their long-range arms by Ukrainian forces to target weapons within western Russia. Some NATO members have already explicitly stated they approve of the use of other arms. However, France is the only provider of long-range missiles to have done so thus far, although it has refrained from comments around the Storm Shadow/ SCALP missiles that both Paris and London have provided to Ukraine.
1
On 11 September US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken met with UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. No new major weapons deliveries were announced. On 12 September Blinken stated that the Biden administration was still considering allowing Ukraine to use long-range weapons such, as Storm Shadow missiles, to hit targets inside western Russia and that he would have further discussions with President Joe Biden upon his return to the US.
On 14 September reports emerged claiming that the UK would unilaterally allow its weapons to be used to do so. However, Foreign Secretary Lammy on 15 September explicitly stated that discussions were still underway.
Important statements
RUSSIA'S RHETORIC
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Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, have repeatedly inveighed against the potential approval of such use of long-range weapons, vowing that they would respond.
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On 12 September Sergei Karaganov, an academic and Putin advisor, told Russia's Kremlin-controlled Kommersant newspaper that Moscow could launch a nuclear NATO strike without triggering an all-out war. Karaganov has previously written articles for Russian state think tanks making the same argument, but the comments received international media attention in yhe context of the long-range strikes debate.
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On 14 September former president Dmitry Medvedev claimed that Moscow could reduce Kyiv to a “giant melted spot” if Western allies gave Kyiv permission to use their weapons for strikes within Russia. This came after on 11 September Speaker of the Duma – Russia’s lower house of parliament – Vyacheslav Volodin stated that the decision would make the US and its allies a party to the war. Both of the prominent Russian political figures have made similar statements in the past and their rhetoric does not mark a major change in tone.​
Impact on the risk of escalation
Currently no impact on risks.
In the event of approval, increased risk of malicious damage; slightly increased risk of collateral damage and direct targeting of commercial assets.
Air-launched missiles are likely to have a limited impact on the escalation:
AKE does not expect the issue to become immediately critical as the majority of the long-range arms in question that have been supplied to Ukraine are Storm Shadow missiles, which must be launched by Ukraine’s small F-16 fleet and its Sukhoi-24 (Su-24) bomber-attackers. Ukraine is estimated to have only nine F-16s and around 20-25 Su-24s. It is expected to have around 20 F-16s by end-2024 and the Su-24 fleet is notably larger than it was at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion thanks to allied supplies and repairs. However, since Kyiv has lost at least 18 Su-24s in the conflict and the first F-16 was downed on 29 August, Ukraine will remain reticent to risk these aircraft flying into Russia itself. AKE estimates that Moscow still has substantial air-defence missiles as evidenced by its continued re-adaption of such projectiles.
ATACMS have the highest potential to increase the risk of escalation:
The other key munitions in the debate are the US-supplied ATACMS missiles, which in contrast to the Storm Shadows can be launched by ground launchers. These have a maximum 300 km effective range and could, in theory, be used by Ukrainian forces operating in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, where the city of Kursk itself as well as the region’s nuclear power plant would be within immediate range. AKE does not expect that Ukrainian forces would target major urban centres or the plant. However, Russian officials have repeatedly insisted that they consider this a genuine risk and one that they have vowed to respond to.
Decision-making will be likely delayed:
AKE does not expect a final decision to be announced by Washington or Westminster in the coming week. One key sticking point is that Western advisors are involved in the maintenance of such systems as well as the interpretation of data from their use, including refining accuracy. Moscow argues that NATO personnel would be programming flight paths into NATO-built missiles if the decision to allow Kyiv’s use of long-range missiles within Russia is approved – marking a significant escalation in Russia’s eyes.
Conclusion:
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AKE’s view is that the use of such weapons on de jure Russian territory would not precipitate a significant change in Russia’s strategy or tactics, although it has notably already steadily grown more brazen in carrying out sabotage in Ukrainian-allied countries since the launch of the full-scale invasion. Our determination is based on the fact that such weapons systems have already been repeatedly used to target Russian positions and military-industrial assets in occupied Crimea and territory in Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Luhansk Oblasts that Putin already claims are legally Russian. While there is a distinction in the Kremlin between responding to attacks in de jure Russia and these claimed territories, it is unwilling to make that distinction publicly.
However, the provision would likely result in an intensification of Russia's hybrid warfare against NATO members.
RUSSIAN STRIKES AGAINST A SHIP IN ROMANIA'S EEZ
Recent developments
On 11 September the Turkish-operated merchant grain ship MV Aya was struck roughly 75 km south of Ukraine's Snake Island (Zmiinyi Island) and thus in Romania's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) on the Black Sea by a Kh-22 supersonic anti-ship missile. Ukrainian officials identified the alleged missile type used, although the claim was subsequently disputed given the limited damage that the ship sustained. The ship was carrying grain from the port of Odesa bound for Egypt.
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Romania's Naval Authority stated that the attack occurred just outside the country's territorial waters, though this appears to have been a mistake since territorial seas extend only 12 nautical miles from a shore whereas an EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles. While the EEZ is not sovereign territory, the respective sovereign country retains exclusive rights in the zone. No casualties were reported and the ship subsequently moved to the Romanian port of Constanta.
Important statements
RUSSIA'S RHETORIC
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The Kremlin initially did not comment on the allegations. On 13 September Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that the Kremlin did not know about the attack and that questions around the allegations should be directed to the military.​
Impact on the risk of escalation
Highlights the potential of direct targeting of commercial assets in NATO member countries' exclusive economic zones, particularly in the logistics industry. It still remains unlikely that Russia would directly target commercial assets in NATO members' countries territority.
The incident creates a precedent for Russia targeting a grain ship on the open sea:
While Russian missiles have struck shipping in Ukrainian ports and adjacent waters repeatedly, the incident is the first to directly strike a grain ship on the open sea – although in August 2023 Russian forces forcibly boarded another Turkish-flagged grain ship, the Sukru Okan, in the Black Sea.
The attack was likely motivated by Russian desires to raise Ukrainian shipping costs, and for shipping firms,commodity traders, and insurers to reconsider their approach to the market:
The potential for further such attacks ishigh. However, it should be noted that Ukrainian air defences in the area have been particularly strong and a RussiaSu-30 attack plane – the kind that launches the Kh-22 missile – was shot down over the Black Sea on the same day,although Ukrainian officials have not formally linked this to the MV Aya attack.
Conclusion:
The attack is unlikely to force a significant NATO response as indicated by the limited Western response. However, setting a precedent for further attacks against grain vessels in the Black Sea, including in NATO members’ EEZ, it increases the risk of miscalculation. The risk would further increase should further such incidents result in significant material damage and/ or casualties. The risk would substantially increase should such an incident occur in a NATO member’s territorial waters.
RUSSIAN ADVANCES ON POKROVSK
Recent developments
Russian forces are advancing on the city of Pokrovsk and the Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka Highway in Donetsk Oblast. The city and the highway form a crucial supply line in the region.
1
On 30 October officials acknowledged that their forces withdrew from the town of Selydove, located approximately 18 km south of Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast. This will allow Russian forces to use the E50 highway which connects Selydove and Pokrovsk to advance to the latter town. Ukrainian officials are preparing for a long battle over the town, erecting barricades and building fortifications, with military experts warning that such a battle will likely take months.
Impact on the risk of escalation
Currently no impact on risks.
Impact limited will be likely limited to the theatre in Ukraine
While there are concerns that the capture of Pokrovsk will embolden further aggression, this will highly likely be
limited to the theatre in Ukraine. Previous Russian captures did not increase the risk of direct confrontation between
Russia and NATO. It is also unlikely to substantially impact Russia’s hybrid war against the West.
Conclusion:
However, the seizure of Pokrovsk will boost Russia’s morale as well as further incentivize the Kremlin to continue the war, which will further decrease the possibility of ceasefire talks or peace settlement in the short and medium terms. Conversely, it would weaken Ukraine’s position in the short and medium term, increasing the risk of an uneasy peace settlement in the unlikely event that the sides launch negotiations.